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Abstract 
This paper revisits the question of debasement by analysing a 
newly compiled dataset with a novel approach, as well as 
employing conventional methods. It finds that mercantile influence 
on monetary policies favoured relative stability, and wage-payers 
did not typically gain from silver debasement. Excess demand for 
bullion was not a major cause of debasement. Yet monetary issues 
were important. Warfare made the debasement of silver but not of 
gold more likely. Regime types had an importance comparable to 
that of warfare: Princes debased silver more often than monetary 
unions and especially city-states. It is likely that fiscal debasements 
were more frequent in principalities, not least because princes 
debased for fiscal reasons also in the absence exceptional needs. 
The conclusion discusses the implications of the findings. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
As a corollary to the revival of interest in medieval trade, scholars 
have increasingly stressed that ‘medieval money matters’ (Wood, 2004). 
Under the conditions of a commodity money system with an inelastic 
supply of bullion, the level of monetisation and therefore 
commercialisation is assumed to have crucially depended on the supply 
of hard money as determined by mining output and the balance of trade 
(cf. Mayhew, 1995a; 1995b; Hatcher, 1996: 187; Munro, 2001: 25, 31 f.; 
Nightingale, 2007; Blanchard, 2009; Britnell, 2009: 115). Still, the focus 
on these exogenous factors may be misplaced. Recent developments in 
the quantitative analysis of late medieval markets indicate that advances 
in financial integration were less closely associated with the ends of the 
‘bullion famines’ of ca. 1390 to 1410 and 1440 to 1460 than with 
debasements (Chilosi and Volckart, 2009) – a finding that raises the 
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question of whether the common assumption that debased coins were 
‘bad’ coins is justified. 
At present, the view that debasements were one of the ‘scourges’ 
of the late medieval economy dominates (Spufford, 1991: 289 ff.). This 
interpretation is based on two related claims. The first one is that 
debasement represented a ‘hidden’ and regressive form of taxation. If 
institutional constraints and asymmetric information on the intrinsic value 
of the coinage prevented nominal rents and wages from adjusting to 
monetary alterations as quickly as prices, debasements harmed the 
clergy and nobility, who lived off rents (Cipolla, 1963; Munro, 1972: 22 f.; 
Bordo, 1986: 341; Spufford, 1991: 308-14; Weber, 1996: 483), and 
labourers, who depended on wages. Employers, by contrast, made a net 
gain (van Werveke, 1949/64; Cipolla, 1963; Lane and Mueller, 1985: 458; 
Pamuk, 2000: 55-58; Kaplanis, 2003; Stahl, 2007: 196). However, to date 
few studies have directly addressed how debasements influenced real 
variables, and the results have been contradictory. Thus, Sussman (1993: 
67 f.) finds that in 1419 the French nobility and wage-earners suffered 
from them because wages and rents adjusted only after about one year 
after the intervention. Pamuk (2000: 57) stresses that wage-earners had 
to lose most, but in the only case where he presents wage data (an 
Ottoman debasement in 1444), protests led to over proportional wage 
increases. According to Munro (2002), wage stickiness implied that in 
Flanders under Count Louis de Male (1346-84) debasements had a long-
term effect: As the quantity of money grew while its intrinsic value 
declined, prices rose and real wages fell. Finally, Nicholas (1987: 6, 132 
f.; 1992: 234) does initially share the view that the adjustment of nominal 
wages did not keep pace with Louis de Male’s debasements. However, 
he later shows that in fourteenth-century Ghent employers regularly 
allowed nominal wages to adjust to inflation, and that in Flanders in the 
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1360s and -70s wage rearrangements more than compensated for 
debasements. 
The second claim on which the current interpretation of 
debasement is based is that it was a primarily fiscal policy motivated by 
warfare: ‘Debasement was, of course, generally a byproduct of war’, as 
Spufford (1991: 289) puts it (cf. Munro, 1972: 20 ff.; 2009; Miskimin, 
1984: ch. 3; Kindleberger, 1991; Sussman, 1993: 67 f.; Motomura, 1994; 
Kaplanis, 2003). Governments gained from debasements because 
consumers who used coins according to their face value would take their 
old money to the mint in order to have it re-minted into a larger nominal 
sum.1 The consequence was that an increase in seigniorage revenues 
proportional to the activity of the mint, which could be netted until the 
purchasing power of the new coins adjusted to their greater quantity and 
lower intrinsic value. From this perspective, the recourse to debasement 
reflected weak fiscal and credit structures in the face of expanding needs 
(Cipolla, 1963; Motomura, 1994; Redish, 2000).2 
While fiscal motives were doubtlessly central in at least some of the 
cases, there are scholars who question how dominant the desire to 
increase revenues actually was. The monetary perspective that they 
stress is associated with a more benign view of debasement than the 
redistributive and fiscal interpretations. Two main versions can be 
distinguished. First, following Keynes (cf. de Roover, 1948: 242), Cipolla 
(1948; 1956; 1963) argues that as the economy expanded (like in Italy 
                                                 
1 Rolnick, Velde and Weber (1996) argue that debasements did not provide additional 
incentives to take money to the mint because consumers used money according to its 
intrinsic value. However, there is abundant evidence that the majority of consumers 
used money according to its face value (e.g. practices such as clipping that would 
otherwise have been pointless), cf. Volckart (2009: 105 f.). 
2 Government debts, where existing, were usually designated in terms of currencies 
that were either less exposed to debasement because they were based on gold (which 
rulers were reluctant to debase, cf. p. 8 f.), or removed from the government’s influence 
because they were foreign, or both (cf. e.g. Zuiderduijn, 2009: 73 ff.; Fuhrmann, 2007: 
141; Rothmann, 2007: 187). Debasing in order to reduce the real value of debts was 
thus rarely an option.  
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during the ‘commercial revolution’ of the high Middle Ages), the demand 
for money increased whereas the supply of bullion was inelastic. 
Debasements helped meeting the resulting excess demand. Likewise, 
North (1994: 44) claims that most debasements carried out during the 
late-fourteenth/early fifteenth-century ‘bullion famine’ were monetary, with 
rulers trying to supply a stable quantity of coinage in the face of rising 
bullion prices. Gemmill and Mayhew (1995: 118 f.) imply a similar 
dynamic. 
While these are views advanced by modern research, late 
medieval governments themselves clung to a second type of monetary 
argument: They claimed that when they debased their coinage, they were 
forced to do so by the need to counter Gresham’s Law. The circulation of 
worn and defaced or foreign coins of similar nominal but lower intrinsic 
value than the domestic ones did, in fact, reduce the demand for 
domestic money. Governments reacted by aligning the bullion content of 
their own newly minted coins with that of the foreign money. Fluctuations 
of bimetallic ratios that increased the intrinsic value of coins above their 
face value had similar consequences and policy implications (Cipolla, 
1963: 414; 1983; Prestwich, 1969; Lane and Mueller, 1985: 31; Glassman 
and Redish, 1988; Volckart, 1996: 213 f., 223; Redish, 2000; Fantacci, 
2008: 61).3 
This paper revisits the question of debasement through a 
comparative analysis of two particularly well-documented but rarely 
compared cases, i.e. Florence and Flanders, and a number of instances 
from Central Europe, that is, from the Holy Roman Empire and 
neighbouring regions. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, this area 
                                                 
3 A similar argument has been put forward by Sargent and Velde (2002), who claim that 
debasement mostly addressed chronic shortages of petty coinage. As shown by Munro 
(1988) and Volckart (2008), however, the evidence is that petty coinage shortage was 
not chronic and debasement did not concentrate on petty coinage. This perspective is 
therefore not considered here. 
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was characterised by a remarkably heterogeneous institutional landscape 
whose importance for debasements has never before been systematically 
examined. The sample therefore allows us to refine our understanding of 
how political institutions shaped monetary policies. The analysis is based 
both on conventional data sources, such as constitutional history and 
wage and mint data, and on a new approach that finds evidence of 
monetary needs in the effects debasements had on gold-silver ratios (i.e. 
the rates at which gold and silver were exchanged in the money market). 
As well as casting new light on cases for which conventional data is 
relatively abundant, this approach allows us to examine poorly 
documented cases, too. It also permits a quantitative assessment of the 
frequency of monetary debasements. Subsequently, we test emerging 
hypotheses about the role of warfare, monetary and institutional factors 
through econometric analysis of data not only from Italy, Flanders and 
Central Europe, but also from France and England. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section (2) 
examines how status groups shaped monetary policies in Flanders, 
Prussia, Florence, Hamburg and Basel. We find that when monetary 
policy was driven by the interests of merchants and members of the 
nobility, rather than by those of princes, silver currencies were 
comparatively stable. Our evidence (section 3) does not bear out the 
received wisdom that wage-payers typically gained from silver 
debasements. On the contrary, real wages usually rose in the years of 
debasements so that the policy tended to have a positive impact in the 
long run, too. Section 4 shows that in Florence, and, to a lesser extent, 
Basel and Hamburg, fiscal needs were less important than in Flanders 
and Prussia. However, even there debasements involved more than just 
the desire to cope with warfare and exceptional fiscal strains. Section 5 
confirms that in Florence debasements were mainly carried out for 
monetary reasons, even if these were unrelated to the ‘bullion famines’. In 
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Flanders, such motives were present in some cases under the counts and 
in all cases after the takeover by the Dukes of Burgundy. 
Section 6 compares how monetary alterations affected gold-silver 
ratios in the principal money markets of the time, i.e. in Bruges and 
Florence. Unlike in Bruges, alterations in Florence had an enduring 
impact, promoting convergence between the money and bullion markets 
gold-silver ratios. Using this yardstick to examine 30 Central European 
debasements (section 7) shows that monetary motives were present in 
almost half of these cases. Evidence of monetary motives is found 
significantly more often when the mint was run by an autonomous city or 
a monetary union. Econometric analysis (section 8) finds that the ‘bullion 
famines’ were not associated with particularly frequent debasements; if 
anything, the opposite holds. Unlike silver debasements, there is no 
evidence that those of gold were caused by warfare. The regime types 
have an importance in explaining silver debasements that is comparable 
to that of warfare, with princely currencies being comparatively unstable. 
Still, evidence that warfare was less important for autonomous cities and 
monetary unions than for princes is mild and inconsistent, suggesting that 
probably they carried out fiscal debasements also when there were no 
exceptional needs. The concluding section discusses the implications of 
the findings. 
 
 
2.  Status Groups 
Figures 1 and 2 show changes in the standards of silver and gold 
currencies used in Florence, Flanders, Basel, Hamburg and Prussia 
between 1300 and 1500.4 Among the gold units, the Florentine Florin had 
                                                 
4 The curves for the silver currencies (fig. 1) chart the development of the fine silver 
equivalents of the units of account, the values being based on the silver content of the 
largest denominations. Note that in some cases there were several debasements or 
reinforcements per year; the curves chart the yearly means only. Lira of Florence: 
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the widest currency. It originated in 1252, and was by the fourteenth 
century used all over Western and Central Europe (Berghaus, 1965; 
Giard, 1967). Flemish Écus, Heaumes and Nobles circulated mainly in 
Flanders and later in the Burgundian Netherlands, though the Écu and 
Noble occasionally appeared beyond the borders of this territory, too. In 
Hamburg, fifteenth-century sources (e.g. Koppmann, 1873; 1878; 
Bollandt, 1960) suggest that gold was practically without exception 
foreign. From the 1430s, the city minted its own gold coins (Stefke, 2002: 
150 f.), but evidently their circulation was limited and their importance 
negligible. 
 
Fig. 1: Silver Debasements/Reinforcements, Indices, 1400=1.0 
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Bernocchi (1975); Pound Grote of Flanders: Blockmans and Blockmans (1979), Munro 
(1972), Spufford (1970), Pusch (1932); Mark of Lübeck (used in Hamburg): Jesse 
(1928); Pound of Basel (since 1403 Rappenmünz Pound): Altherr (1910), Cahn (1901); 
Mark of Prussia: Volckart (1996). The gold curves (fig. 2) chart the development of the 
fine gold contents of the listed gold units. Again, in some cases there were several 
debasements or reinforcements per year; the graph shows yearly means only. Florin: 
Bernocchi (1975); Ecu, Heaume and Noble: Blockmans and Blockmans (1979), Munro 
(1972), Spufford (1970), Pusch (1932). 
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Fig. 2: Gold Debasements/Reinforcements, Indices, 1400=1.0 
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Comparing the two graphs shows the familiar phenomenon that 
gold tended to be significantly more stable than silver. This can be linked 
to the interest of international merchants in maintaining the stability and 
reputation of gold with which they were paid, at the expense of silver, 
which employers used to pay wages. As stressed, for instance, by a 
fourteenth-century Florentine chronicler, ‘[t]he merchants sold in florins, 
and the manufactures paid in soldi’ (Coppo Stefani, 1940: 382). 
Accordingly, alterations of the Florin were rare and were shaped by the 
concerns of merchants. For example, the ‘Fiorino Largo’, introduced in 
1422, imitated the Venetian Ducat (Targioni Tozzetti, 1775: 263; Orsini, 
1790: xxi; Bernocchi, 1975: 63), whose increasing popularity was 
threatening the Florin’s status as primary medium of international 
payments (Cipolla, 1956: 21). 
It is also evident, however, that unlike in the high Middle Ages 
(Lopez, 1951: 221 ff.; Cipolla, 1963) commercial influence on monetary 
policies was associated with relatively stable silver currencies. In 
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Florence and Hamburg, where monetary policies were designed by 
merchants, silver was comparatively stable. Between 1300 and 1500 the 
Lira lost 0.45 percent of its silver content per year, the Mark of Lübeck 
(used in Hamburg) between 1350 and 1500 0.74 percent. Moreover, 
when Florence was dominated by the major guilds (before 1343 and 
1383-1443) the Lira lost on average only 0.49 and 0.37 percent of fine 
silver per year, respectively. Under Medici rule (from 1443), when the 
major guilds remained hegemonic, the Lira also remained stable, 
suffering a barely perceptible loss of on average 0.21 percent per year 
between 1443 and 1500. By contrast, during the ‘democratic’ interlude 
(1343-1382), when the minor guilds influenced policies, the average 
yearly loss amounted to 0.90 percent. 
Altogether, Basel’s currency was less stable than that of Florence, 
suffering a loss of on average 0.61 percent of its fine silver content per 
year. The particular configuration of the social conflict meant that 
merchants may have played a part in accounting for this. The temporary 
dominance of the trade guilds may have meant that in the 1370s the local 
Pound was debased to erode the real value of rents. Conversely, after the 
nobility returned to power in 1375 and when Basel entered the 
‘Rappenmünz Union’ (a monetary union with the Dukes of Austria and 
some neighbouring cities, cf. Cahn, 1901: 49; Weber, 1996: 483) in 1403, 
the currency was reinforced. 
In Prussia, the attempt of the Teutonic Order to increase the value 
of its rental income by reinforcing the coinage without the consent of the 
mercantile upper classes failed in the 1370s. In 1380, the Mark was 
debased to align its silver content with that of the Bohemian Groat, the 
most important currency used in East Central European long distance 
trade. After a period of debasements in the early fifteenth century, the 
reinforcement of the Prussian Mark in 1416 again aligned it with the groat, 
mercantile influence again proving crucial (Volckart, 1996: 50 f., 86 f.). In 
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the second half of the fifteenth century, the government repeatedly 
carried out mild debasements that allowed the merchants from 
Königsberg to profit from the effects of Gresham’s law in the neighbouring 
cities of Danzig, Thorn and Elbing, which had become autonomous in 
1454 but preserved a currency union with the State of the Teutonic Order 
(Volckart, 1996: 213 f.). While working to the advantage of the merchants, 
the government of Prussia depended less on their and the nobility’s 
support in managing the coinage than those of the cities discussed 
above. Correspondingly, overall the Mark was considerably less stable 
than their currencies, losing on average 1.17 percent of its fine silver 
content per year. 
Still, even the Prussian currency was stable compared to the 
Flemish Pound Grote in the period before the takeover of Flanders by 
Burgundy in 1384. The Pound lost on average 2.32 percent of its fine 
silver content per year under Count Louis de Nevers (1322-46) and 1.99 
percent under Louis de Male (1346-84). The Flemish towns may have 
been the most commercialised and industrialised in late medieval 
Northern Europe, but monetary policies were designed by the counts 
without consulting them. After 1384, the importance of the estates grew 
and the currency became more stable (Munro, 1972: 22 f.; Spufford, 
1966; 1991: 310 ff.): Before the monetary unification of the Burgundian 
Netherlands in 1434, the average yearly loss was 0.63 percent. Between 
then and the death of Charles the Bold in 1477 it was down to 0.38 
percent. This increased stability seems to have been primarily the result 
of the interest of the nobility and clergy in preserving their rental income, 
which allegedly had been harmed by the Flemish counts’ debasements in 
the fourteenth century (de Win, 1986: 97 f.), rather than that of the 
influence of the mercantile elites. In the Burgundian estates general, 
urban power stagnated or declined, given that ducal territories such as 
Hainault and Brabant were much less commercialised than Flanders. 
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3. Real Wages 
Figures 3 to 5 show how real wages related to silver monetary 
standards in Florence, Hamburg and Bruges.5 For Florence, there is little 
evidence of wage ‘stickiness’. Nominal wages almost always changed 
from year to year and seem regularly to have adjusted to silver 
debasements (cf. Goldthwaite, 2009: 488). Thus, in 1347 when nominal 
wages rose by almost 26 percent, real wages were nearly twice as high 
as in 1344. In 1369 and 1393 they were higher than in 1367, reflecting a 
more than proportional nominal wage rise in 1368, and 1389. Although 
they were slightly lower in 1427 than in 1424, they became considerably 
higher by 1428, as the 1426 debasement was also accompanied by a 
over-proportional increase in nominal wages. 
                                                 
5 The method used to compute real wages in Florence and Hamburg is the same as 
that used by Munro (2002) for Bruges, except that, given that there is little published 
data on prices of industrial goods, in Florence the commodity basket is more limited. 
Industrial goods represented a small share of the employee families’ expenses, and the 
bias resulting from this neglect should be limited. The Florentine data has been drawn 
from Goldthwaite (1980; 1995), de la Roncière (1982) and Tognetti (1995). The 
Hamburg data has been drawn from primary sources (Koppmann, 1869; 1873; 1878; 
1880; 1883; 1892; 1894). Needless to say the estimates are subject to a number of 
caveats; for example, prices of goods are influenced by variations in quality, and wages 
by variations between seasons and building sites. For a detailed discussion of the 
issues involved with computing the estimates see Munro (2002). 
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Fig. 3: Silver Monetary Alterations and Real Wages in Florence, 1336-
1450, Indices (1400=1) 
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Fig. 4: Silver Monetary Alterations and Real Wages in Hamburg, 1350-
1500, Indices (1475-79=1) 
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Fig. 5: Silver Monetary Alterations and Real Wages in Bruges, 1350-
1450, Indices (1400=1) 
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Unlike in Florence, industry played a minor role in the economy of 
etary League), i.e. Wismar and Lübeck. Wages 
were much more important in the third partner city, Lüneburg, which had 
important salt works and joined the League in 1384 (Witthöft, 1976; 
Kahle, 1987). If we compare the thirty years before that year with the 
thirty years after, we find that the Mark did indeed become less stable: 
Before, it lost on average 0.60 percent of its silver content per year; after 
1384, the yearly loss increased to 0.94 percent. However, the most 
serious reduction in the fine silver content of the Mark had taken place in 
1379, five years before Lüneburg joined the union. This debasement had 
been preceded by a fall in real wages, which actually rose in the year of 
the debasement and after 1384. A sharp price rise occurred two years 
after the debasement and was matched by a more than proportional 
increase in nominal wages. By the 1460s the silver content of the coinage 
Hamburg and two of its partners with whom it had formed a currency 
union (the Wendish Mon
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had declined by about 50 percent, but real wages were about the same 
as in t
le’s 
 five 
ar 
 decline in real wages greater than 1 
percen  a 
 
r, 
d by 
 1416 
he 1370s. The relatively mild alterations of the 1460s do not seem 
to have affected them at all. 
In Flanders, where the towns monitored monetary policies, the 
evidence – i.e. yearly data on master building craftsmen in Bruges 
compiled by Munro (2002: 252 f.) – runs against the claim that de Ma
debasements systematically depressed real wages (van Werveke, 
1949/64). Nominal wages were considerably more ‘sticky’ than in 
Florence, but in most cases (7 out of 12: 1351, 1353, 1355, 1359, 1365, 
1369 and 1380) they actually grew in the year of the debasement. In
of these instances this was due to falling prices, suggesting that in 
Flanders, like in Hamburg, they often took a while to adjust. In the 
remaining two cases, the proportional price rise was below the nominal 
wage rise, as this exceeded the debasement. All nominal wage 
adjustments taking place in these years occurred either during the ye
before or after a debasement. Only in 1363 was the proportional change 
in nominal wages slightly less than that in the intrinsic value of the 
coinage, and often the former was significantly higher than the latter. 
Debasement coincided with a
t only in 1364 and 1383. In the first case this was countered by
rise in 1365 and 1366. 
Reinforcements in 1384, 1390 and 1409 were tied to over 
proportional reductions in nominal wages, understandably leading to
social unrest (de Roover, 1942: 230; Spufford, 1991: 290). Howeve
debasements did not typically cause real wages to fall in the Burgundian 
years either. On the contrary, between 1386 and 1388 they rose 
substantially because the monetary interventions were accompanie
over proportional wage increases. Even if real wages were lower in
than in 1417, they rose in 1418 and -19. In 1429, they were only slightly 
lower than in 1428. 
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Table 1: Trends in Real Wages in Bruges, Florence and Hamburg, 1350-
1450 (Yearly Data) 
 
  Period Years covered Percentage change 
Bruges 1350-1389 41 0.23 
  1390-1450 61 -4.21** 
Florence 1350-1389 31 0.12 
 1393-1450 29 0.39* 
Hamburg 1350-1387 19 -2.34 
Key: *=significant at 10%, **=significant at 5% 
 
Munro’s own data do not support his view that Louis de Male’s 
debasements implied long-term real wage reductions between 1350 and 
the late 1380s (Munro, 2002: 211 ff.). Comparing Flemish conditions with 
the behaviour of wages in Florence and Hamburg leads to the same 
conclusion (cf. table 1). After the Black Death, real wages appear to have 
risen more rapidly in Bruges, where debasements were much more 
 and 1387, and Florence, which 
he mid-1370s and a more consistent rise in real 
w ges in the lf of the f  In B e, 
deflation probably contributed to their late fourteenth-century rise. 
However, th rt-ter ffect: From the b  of the fifteenth 
c a sed t w. These patte  well as the lack of 
similar dynamics ar t that the ‘bullion famine’ – an 
exogenous shock un cision makers – had a 
tronger influence on the behaviour of real wages in Bruges than the 
Dukes
frequent and substantial, than in Hamburg, where they seem to have 
fallen significantly between 1350
experienced a famine in t
a  first ha ifteenth century. ruges, like in Florenc
is was a sho m e eginning
entury, re l wages cea o gro rns as
ound 1409 sugges
foreseen by political de
s
’ of Burgundy stable-currency policy. When the Flemish cloth 
industry declined in the first half of the fifteenth century, real wages fell 
despite the fact that debasements were much rarer than under Louis de 
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Male. Hence, the data justify stressing the importance of monetary fa
and the limitations of Malthusianism for modelling medieval wages. Still, 
on the whole debasements seem to have had beneficial effects for w
earners both in the short and the long run, being often accompanied b
over proportional rises in real wages that anticipated price rises. 
 
 
4.  Fiscal Motives 
In Florence, there was hardly any link between debasements and 
fiscal needs and warfare (cf. Cipolla, 1983: 88). With about 0.6 percent of 
the nominal output, seigniorage and brassage rates on gold remaine
constant throughout.6 Their contribution to the city’s expenditure wa
negligible, remaining well below 1 percent and decreasing over time. 
Silver mint revenues in periods of intense activity were more substan
reaching about 5000 Florins per year. However, in the later fourteenth 
century this was less than 1 percent of the yearly expenditures (cf. 
Becker, 1965: 433 f.); the contribution shrank considerably in the first half 
of the fifteenth century, when mint output was comparatively low. The 
actual contribution to the state finances was even lower, as probably 
about half of the revenue was retained by the mint. The proportion of 
silver withheld there rose considerably in 1347: From c. 1.2 perce
ctors 
age-
y 
d 
s 
tial, 
nt to 
more than 4.5 percent, when fiscal needs played a part (Bernocchi, 1975: 
196; Cipolla, 1983: 44 f.). However, in 1369 it declined, as in 1372, when 
ere debased. Similarly, in 1427 the rate was lower 
than in
 
                                                
the small silver coins w
 1423, suggesting that the 1426 debasement was not fiscally 
motivated. If the rates applying to the minting of petty coins are anything 
to go by, the 1391 and 1403 debasements were not accompanied by a
 
6 The Florentine mint data presented here and in the next section has been 
extrapolated from Bernocchi (1975). The brassage was a fee that covered the 
production costs of the coinage apart from the cost of bullion (Schrötter, 1930: 83 f.).  
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rise either: Around 1426 these were the same as between 1371 and 
1374. 
Florence was not an isolated case. In Basel, for instance, neither 
wars nor disasters correlate strongly with debasements. Out of eight 
cases of silver debasements only those of 1377 (decided about two
weeks after a major fire) and of 1425 and 1433 (carried out during the 
preparation and the hosting of the General Council) may have been 
linked to fiscal strains. There was, however, no debasement when fire
destroyed large parts of the city in 1354 and 1357 or when Basel 
participated in military campaigns in 1374, 1409, 1441-49 and 1475-77
76 out of the 174 years which the records cover (1361 to 1534), Basel’s 
revenue office did not register any payments out of the mint (Harms, 
1909; 1910). In the rest of the years, the share of the income derived from 
the mint was on average c. 1.3 percent, with a peak of almost 11 per
in 1387. Debasements did cause a rise in mint revenues; for example in 
1387 (when the Pound lost c. 7 percent of its fine silver content), in 1388
(-23 percent) and in 1400 (-16 percent). However, in 1377 and 1378, 
when t
 
s 
. In 
cent 
 
he Pound was debased by 25 and 11 percent, respectively, and in 
1481,  
ht 
ed 
 
 with 
relatively mild, with the Mark losing only about 3 percent of its fine silver 
 mint in 
when it lost more than 28 percent of its silver content, seigniorage
did not amount to more than 1 percent of Basel’s total revenues. 
Hamburg presents a similar picture. Despite the fact that the fig
against Denmark in the 1360s and against England in the 1470s involv
both Hamburg and its partners in its monetary union, neither of them
seems to have caused debasements. In addition, Hamburg repeatedly 
took part in smaller conflicts with neighbouring princes or lords and
pirates in the North Sea, as in 1398, 1400 to 1401 and 1433 to 1435. The 
latter war may actually have been linked to a debasement, but this was 
content. Hamburg’s revenue office registered an income from the
only 48 of the 129 years for which the city’s revenues are recorded 
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(between 1350 and 1562) (Koppmann, 1869; 1873; 1878; 1880; 1883
1892; 1894). The average seigniorage share in those years when there 
were mint revenues amounted to just over 2 percent. In 1379, when the 
Mark was debased by over 28 percent, Hamburg received a substantial 
contribution (4.8 percent of its revenues) from the mint, but in 1469, when
the Mark lost 9.7 percent of its fine silver, the corresponding value was
1.9 percent. Other debasements in 1392 and 1461 (by 8.5 and 17 
percent, respectively) correspond to an even lower share of the mint in 
total recorded revenues, 0.5 and 0.2 percent respectively. 
; 
 
 
l, 
o 
 
w 
 
 
The evidence that war and fiscal needs influenced monetary 
policies is stronger for Flanders (van Werveke, 1931/64; Blockmans and 
Blockmans, 1979; Munro, 2009), particularly in the pre-Burgundian 
years.7 The Flemish mints, unlike those in Florence, Hamburg and Base
provided a substantial if declining contribution to the budget. The counts 
of Flanders increased the seigniorage rate regularly when they debased 
their gold. In at least five cases, this applied to debasements of silver, to
(though here, there are cases when the seignorage rate fell in connection
with debasements: 1343, 1354 and 1359). After the 1337 debasement, 
the contribution of the seigniorage to Louis de Nevers’ revenues gre
from just over 4 to 12.7 percent. Louis de Male may have drawn an 
average of more than 10 percent of his yearly budget from seigniorage. 
The Burgundian dukes enjoyed comparatively sound finances. Until the 
mid-1420s, they relied on seigniorage to meet an average of perhaps c. 4
percent of the Flemish yearly expenditure. After 1432, however, 
debasements ceased. In consequence, the seigniorage’s contribution to
                                                 
7 The Flemish mint data presented here and in the next section has been drawn from 
Munro (1972; 1981), Spufford (1970) and Blockmans and Blockmans (1979). In 
contrast to them, however, we broke down the data listed in the sources 
unequal spans of time) to daily rather than to monthly averages, befor
(which cover 
e aggregating the 
yearly v ore 
precise 62: 
alues. This led to a few discrepancies with their aggregates, but yields m
 results. The figures on the Flemish budget are drawn from Vaughan (19
227, 230; 1966: 106-118; 1970: 259, 262), Blockmans and Blockmans (1979: 75) and 
Elsen (1995: 162). 
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total revenues shrank rapidly to become negligible (cf. Spufford, 197
133). 
Altogether, in Flanders/Burgundy debasements and exceptional 
fiscal needs were less closely associated than often claimed (Blockmans 
and Blockmans, 1979; Munro, 2009). First, under Louis de Male, more 
often than not the coinage was debased when there was no major military 
conflict, as in 1346, 1351, 1353, 1355, 1362, 1363, 1364, 1365, 1368, 
1369 and 1373. Taken together with the comparatively large role of the
seigniorage, frequent debasements that were carried out in relatively
peaceful times, too, suggest that the count relied on them as a regular 
source of finance (like the Ottoman Empire, cf. Pamuk, 2000: 50-55). 
Second, the tendency to debase in the absence of military conflict 
continued in the Burgundian period (1386, 1387, 1388, 1429, 143
1433 and 1434), when, in addition, exceptional needs were met through 
alternative sources. Neither the disastrous crusade (1394-1397) nor the
costly 
0: 
 
 
0, 1432, 
 
French campaigns in 1405, 1410 and 1411 and the annexation of 
Luxem
e 
he 
 
ularly 
bourg (1443) were financed through debasement. 
Again, we can find a parallel in Central Europe: Prussia. Since the 
creation of the Polish-Lithuanian union in 1386, the Teutonic Order cam
under increasing pressure. The period of crisis into which it entered 
turned out to be practically permanent (Dralle, 1975; Burleigh, 1984). T
Order fought (and lost) major wars against Poland-Lithuania not only in 
1409/10, but also in 1422, 1454 to 1466, 1478 and 1520/21 – the last 
conflict leading to the replacement of its rule by a secular duchy. The 
Mark of Prussia was frequently debased: Mostly either in the run-up to
wars (1408, 1409, 1410, 1451), during wars (1455, 1478), or immediately 
after (1412, 1415). The Teutonic Order’s fiscal difficulties were partic
severe after its defeat in 1410. To collect the ransom for the knights 
captured by the Polish (100,000 Bohemian Groats), the Order reduced 
the silver content of the Mark by almost 75 percent, hoping to be able to 
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exploit the time lag between the debasement and the appreciation 
Groat (Volckart, 1996: 66 ff.). Still, as mentioned above, here as in 
Flanders debasements did occur outside the context of wars, with some 
of them either certainly (1380 and mild debasements in the later fifteenth
century) or probably (1399 and 1442) reflecting mercantile interests. 
 
of the 
 
 
 
on 
 
 
e 
ould expect if they had been aimed solely at addressing this issue: Its 
ctual relevance seems to have been overstated (cf. figures 1 and 2). 
n Florence debasements were mainly 
monet , 
 
5.  The Supply of Money 
The link between commercial influence and relatively stable silver 
currencies that we identified earlier is not the only evidence against the 
argument that an excess demand for bullion was a major cause of 
debasement. Debasements were particularly frequent in Flanders after
the Black Death, when the demand for money fell. With the partial 
exceptions of late-fourteenth-century Basel and mid-fifteenth century 
Prussia, silver debasements did not become more frequent during a late 
medieval ‘bullion famines’. The 1402 debasement of the Florin is the only 
instance of substantial debasement of gold during the heights of bulli
scarcity. 
Post-1350 Florentine and late medieval Flemish debasements have
been interpreted as a means to counter the effects of wear and tear 
(Goldthwaite and Mandich, 1994: 15; Goldthwaite, 2009: 488; Fantacci,
2008: 61). In a number of cases, particularly in Florence, they were mild 
enough (below 3 percent) to suggest that this motive may have played a 
role. Still, on the whole they were neither as small nor as regular as w
w
a
This is not to deny that i
ary (cf. Cipolla, 1983; Goldthwaite and Mandich, 1994; Goldthwaite
2009: 48): In all cases where mint data is available, monetary needs 
appear to have been genuine. Thus, the output of Florins was below
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average in the decade before the mild debasement of 1391 and moved 
towards normal levels in the year of the alteration. Between 1380 a
1390 a yearly average of 96 kg of gold was minted, as compared to an
overall yearly average of 183 kg until 1435. In 1391, 151 kg of gold were 
minted. We lack data from the 1402 debasement, when according to 
Targioni Tozzetti (1775: 261 f.) the city was ‘forced to reduce the weight 
of the Flo
nd 
 
rin … because it was customary for all the other powers 
contin
e 
ut 
proba ace 
r 
e 
 
 
reacted 
Pisan ‘invasion’ and triggered a sudden rise in the minting of silver that 
uously to worsen their coinage, … with the consequence … that the 
city was being emptied of good gold and was filled with bad coins’. W
know, however, that with just 32 kg output was very low when another 
debasement was carried out in 1423; then it grew significantly. In 1424 
the gold output reached 138 kg. 
Turning to silver, in 1345, when the Grosso was debased, its outp
was exceptionally low: 299 kg. This was because following a rise in the 
price of silver relative to gold in the 1330s and early 1340s, which 
bly resulted from an inflow of gold from the East, the Grosso’s f
value had fallen below its intrinsic value. The coins were therefore melted 
rather than minted. Since the gold-silver ratio continued to fall, anothe
debasement was needed in 1347, carried out by minting new Grossi 
whose higher face value was not compensated by a proportional increas
in their intrinsic value (Pagnini del Ventura, 1775: 393 ff.; Villani, 1845;
Coppo Stefani, 1940: 147; Bernocchi, 1975: 190, 260 ff.; Cipolla, 1983: 
42). From then until 1351, their output rose substantially (from 1,124 to 
4,565 kg). 
When ‘bad’ Pisan coins flooded Florence between 1353 and 1367,
its output of silver was very low (yearly average 328 kg). The mint 
by reintroducing a medium-sized coin in 1368 and by debasing the 
Grosso and Quattrino in 1369 and 1371, respectively (Bernocchi, 1975: 
200-204; Cipolla, 1983: 69-74). The last intervention put an end to the 
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reached over 8,000 kg in 1372 and 1373. It is likely that in 1392 similar 
circumstances led to the debasement of the Grosso. In 1391, its output 
was o
, 
sso in 
ly 
e-
, 
e 
tput 1334-1338: 662 kg; 1336: 559 kg; and 1337, before May: 
678 kg
nt. 
at 
t 
 
 
sive 
). As stressed by Laurent 
(1933 : 
nly 246 kg, to go up to 818 kg in the following year. During the 
‘bullion famine’, however, silver ceased to be minted (1392 to 1402: Day
1980/87: 26). Finally, it seems that the mild debasement of the Gro
1426 was also preceded by a relatively low mint output. In 1423, the 
figure was 179 kg; by 1427 the output was 826 kg. Yet, output seems to 
have begun to rise before the debasement. 
Flemish data suggest that the May 1337 debasement was pure
fiscal. Blockmans and Blockmans (1979: 72) see the 1337 intervention as 
partly reacting to the French debasement of January 1337. The 1337 pr
debasement data, however, signal no slow mint activity. On the contrary
output was in line with the average level of the period and rising (averag
monthly ou
), as the seigniorage rate had been reduced in January 1337. The 
ordinance of May 1337 sharply increased the seigniorage rate; this 
explains a temporary fall of the output in the month of the debaseme
However, both output and seigniorage remained particularly high for the 
following twelve months (average monthly output 914 kg). The claim th
the April 1343 debasement was defensive against a French debasemen
in June 1342, as the towns were driving the monetary policy (Blockmans
and Blockmans, 1979: 73), is more convincing. In April 1343, output was
actually less than a fifth of what it had been four months before the 
debasement (105 as compared to 558 kg), and this despite the fact that 
the debasement was linked to a reduction in the seigniorage rate. 
Louis de Male’s interventions were less unambiguously aggres
than often assumed (van Werveke, 1949/64: 261; Blockmans and 
Blockmans, 1979: 81; Murray, 2005: 126-30
: 40), he did face a genuine scarcity of bullion, and Day’s (1980/87
14) interpretation that his motives were mixed seems correct. The output 
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of gold was high before the debasements of the Mouton between 1359 
and 1364 (the yearly output had been above 2000 kg since 1355 and 
reached more than 4000 kg in 1357; 1364, when just 529 kg of gold were 
minted, was exceptional). Although this suggests purely fiscal motives, 
there is evidence of monetary needs for the debasements of the Écu in 
1355, which was preceded by a rapid decline (from 1140 kg in 1352
kg in 1354), and between 1381 and 1384: In 1377 and at the beginning 
1380s, output was well below 500 kg, falling to 192 kg in 1384. Silver 
presents a similar picture. There is strong evidence of purely fiscal 
motives in May 1351, October 1353 and October 1383: Mint output in the 
months before the debasements was high (except in September 1353) 
and alterations were linked to a rise in the seigniorage rate. However, in 
the months before December 1354, November 1359, December 136
February 1368 and October 1369 output declined or was low, and (with 
the exception of February 1368) the seigniorage rate was reduced 
 to 82 
of 
1, 
in 
conne
ian 
the 
 
 
 and 
ction with the debasements. 
All debasements for which we have mint data in the Burgund
years were preceded by either low or declining outputs, indicating that 
presence of genuine monetary issues became a precondition of 
debasements. Thus, the gold output was exceptionally low in 1415 (less 
than 2 kg) before the Noble was debased in 1417. Despite a sudden rise
it remained low (less than 12 kg) before the 1419 debasement of the 
Heaume. Between 1427 and 1428 there was sudden fall from 1419 to 
365 kg, before the Noble was debased again in 1429. The 1434 
debasement of the Peter, the 1470 debasement of the Philippus and the
1478 debasement of the Andreas were all preceded by declining outputs. 
Before silver debasements were carried out in November 1386, April 
1387 and February 1388, output had been falling rapidly, owing to the 
combined effects of debasements in France and the Low Countries
the 1385 reinforcement. Where in 1385, 1747 kg were minted, in the 
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following year the figure was as low as 310 kg. Between the 1390 
reinforcement and a mild debasement in 1392 output declined, too. We 
lack data from the year of the December 1416 debasement, but we kno
that in the aftermath of the 1410 reinforcement there was a sharp fall in 
mint activity, probably exacerbated by a French debasement in 1415. 
Between 1412 and 1413 mint outpu
w 
t fell from 6957 kg to 700 kg; by 1415, 
it was
 kg in 
t 
 to 
ndian 
 
.8 As 
 446 kg. Likewise, debasements in 1426, 1427 and 1429 were 
preceded by rapidly declining outputs. In the year before the 1423 
reinforcement, 16,481 kg of silver were minted, in contrast to 427
1427. It is only after the substantial debasement of 1429 that minting wen
back to the pre-reinforcement level. The effect was, however, short-lived. 
By the time the coinage was debased again in 1432, output had fallen
676 kg. In view of these figures, Munro’s (2009: 24-27) rejection of 
monetary motives in favour of purely fiscal ones during the Burgu
period is unconvincing. 
 
 
6.  Gold-Silver Ratios in Bruges and Florence 
Bruges and Florence are ideal starting points for an analysis of how
monetary alterations affected gold-silver ratios because data on 
exchange rates from these places are exceptionally well-preserved
mentioned earlier, debasements had a temporary effect on the 
purchasing power of coins, which lasted until prices adjusted to their 
growing quantity and their falling intrinsic value. One would expect the 
                                                 
8 To compute the gold-silver ratios used here and in the subsequent analysis, the 
following assumptions have been made: first, unless specified otherwise, transactions 
were carried out manually; second, if not explicitly stated otherwise, the sources 
presupposed argent le roi and gold of corresponding purity as raw materials; third
people used the largest silver denominations available to pay for high-purchasing-
power gold coins; fourth, after debasements, within the home territory, new mon
replaced old coins within one year, whereas abroad, adjustment entailed a time lag o
one year; and, fifth, gold and silver coins suffered alike from wear and tear. For a 
detailed discussion of the rationale behind and the implications of these assumptions 
see Chilosi and Volckart (2009). 
, 
ey 
f 
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exchange rates between gold and silver to follow analogous dynamics; if 
anything, the money market should adjust more rapidly than other 
markets. Indeed, according to Spufford (1991: 293), late medieval 
exchange rates reacted to significant debasements in a matter of weeks
or even days. Munro (19
 
72: 31), by contrast, emphasises that financial 
markets lacked flexibility. Recent studies estimate the typical speed of 
adjustment after a shock to be in the order of months (Volckart and Wolf, 
uges, 
2006; Kugler, 2008; Chilosi and Volckart, 2009). 
 
Fig. 6: Monetary Alterations and Monthly Gold-Silver Ratios in Br
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Fig. 7: Monetary Alterations and Monthly Gold-Silver Ratios in Florence, 
1300-145010 
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 Exchange rates: Spufford (1986: 3 ff.); bullion content Bernocchi (1975). 10
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Fig. 8: Monetary Alterations and Monthly Gold-Silver Ratios in Siena, 
1300-145011 
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In Bruges, exchange rates between gold and silver coins adjusted 
to monetary alterations in a matter of months (fig. 6). Data from April 1389 
and December 1391 show that after the January 1390 reinforcement, the 
gold-silver ratios were only slightly lower than before, indicating that the 
intervention had no enduring effect. This is confirmed by the September 
1409 reinforcement: It did lead to a sudden upward shift of the gold silver 
ratio, but this lasted just over a year. By January 1411 the ratio had 
returned to its pre-reinforcement value.12 
                                                 
11 Exchange rates: Bernocchi (1976: 92 ff.); bullion content: Bernocchi (1975) and 
Toderi (1992).  
12 The spread between the ratios calculated on the basis of the Ducat and the 
Genovino that developed since the middle of the 1390s mirrors the emergence of the 
Ducat as the more important medium of international transactions, for which merchants 
were prepared to pay a premium. 
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This is not, however, what happened in Florence and Siena (figs
and 7).
. 6 
re, monetary alterations were not followed by adjustments of 
the exchange rates, with the consequence that debasements caused 
enduring shifts in the gold-silver ratios. The dynamic was described by 
the late eighteenth century Florentine scholar Pagnini del Ventura (1775: 
411) as ‘one of the many not easily perceivable combinations, of which 
the matter of money is capable … In effect, the quantity of fine silver, 
which was received in barter [for the Florin], came to be reduced’. To 
understand this pattern, we concentrate on the 1345 and the 1391 
debasements. We do this for a number of reasons: First, these years are 
relatively well-covered by the gold-silver ratios; second, at least the 
debasement of 1345 has been amply studied so that the discussion is 
grounded; third, both debasements were substantial alterations, making 
their effects particularly marked; fourth, they involved silver only so that 
the analysis is comparatively simple; and finally, as argued in the 
previous section, they represent two distinct ‘ideal types’ of monetary 
ebasements. 
egan to diverge in 1333. In 
Siena between 1323 and 1333, the money market ratio had moved into 
the same direction as the Florentine bullion market ratio: It had fallen, 
 gold became cheaper and silver more expensive. From 
13 The
d
Just before the debasement of the Florentine Grosso in October 
1345, gold was less (and silver more) expensive on the bullion than on 
the money market. The gold-silver ratio calculated on the basis of the 
price of silver ingots in Florins for 1345 is 1:11 (Cipolla, 1983: 17 f.). At 
the same time, the ratio based on the exchange rate between Florin and 
Grosso was 1:14.7. The spread seems to have developed as a result of a 
fall in the bullion market ratio that in 1320 had been about 1:14, too. 
Sienese data suggest that the two ratios b
indicating that
                                                 
13 Given the proximity of Florence and Siena, we can use Sienese data to illuminate 
patterns during periods not covered by the Florentine series. 
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1333 t
ect 
old 
 
 the 
ve 
. 
y-
is 
ve remained stable at this time (Goldthwaite, 2009: 488). 
Owing
et 
 
 
s 
at 
o 1343, however, the Sienese money market ratio went up again, 
whereas the bullion market ratio continued to fall. The timing of the 
divergence suggests that from about 1333, with silver becoming more 
expensive, the intrinsic value of the Grosso climbed above its face value. 
In consequence, consumers ceased demanding Grossi to use them as 
money, relying instead on substitutes like the Florin. As the demand for 
Grossi declined and that for Florins grew, Grossi depreciated with resp
to Florins at the same time as silver was appreciating with respect to g
on the bullion market. 14 In consequence of the 1345 debasement in
Florence, not only did the intrinsic value of the Grosso fall below its face 
value; the gold-silver ratio on the money market also converged with
bullion market ratio: By 1347, both ratios had stabilised at between abo
1:10 and 1:10.5. The Sienense debasement of 1350 had the same result
As for the Florentine debasement of 1390, both Sienese and 
Florentine data indicate that it was preceded by a rise in the mone
market gold-silver ratio. The Florentine bullion market gold-silver ratio 
supposed to ha
 to more than twenty years without a debasement, by the late 
1380s the money market was very likely ‘dirty’, i.e. local demand was m
with ‘bad’ foreign silver coins. The expected quantity of silver that could
be obtained in exchange for the Florin accordingly decreased, causing a
depreciation of silver with respect to gold in the money market, but not in 
that for bullion. By aligning the bullion contents of the Florin and the 
Grosso with those of the ‘bad’ foreign coins, however, uncertainty wa
reduced. Consequently, once again the money market ratio stabilised 
around 1:10.5 (the same level as after the previous debasement). 
                                                 
14 Although the divergence could have been exploited by speculators in a way that 
stimulated the demand for the Grossi, this adjusting mechanism does not seem to have 
operated: perhaps their scarcity implied high transaction costs. 
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7.  Central European Gold-Silver Ratios 
We can apply the two ideal types identified in the previous sec
– i.e. adjustment of the gold-silver ratio in the absence and non-
adjustment in the presence of monetary motives – to Central European 
debasements, too. When there was no adjustment, the effect of a 
debasement on the gold-silver ratio resembles a level shift. Hence, we 
can use the Chow test (Chow, 1960) to examine if there is evidence of 
monetary needs behind Central European debasements. The test is 
relatively undemanding in terms of data availability and thus suited to
investigate the possibility of multiple breaks occurring in a relatively short
span of time. Its main drawback is that, unlike structural time series 
models (Harvey, 1989), it assumes stationarity of the level before and 
after each structural break. However, the available data are insufficient to 
tion 
 
 
take th o 
 
 
 a 
, the 
ed 
perspective of 13 cities.15 The results of the tests are summarised in  
                                                
is approach. Moreover, the violations of the assumption are s
limited that they hardly affect the results. An alternative non-standard
approach that does not assume stationarity and directly tested lack of 
adjustment produced almost identical results. Before carrying out the test,
we examine if the gold-silver ratio moved in the direction predicted by
monetary intervention: Silver debasements should lead to a sudden 
decrease of the gold-silver ratio, and gold debasements to an increase. 
As shown by the previous analysis, not all debasements in a monetary 
area need to have been motivated by the same reason. We therefore 
carry out the Chow test individually on each debasement. Specifically
test examines if the intervention led to a level shift of the series compris
between the previous and the subsequent debasement. 
In this way we examine 30 cases of debasement from the 
 
rier: 
ia (1996); Pound Grote: 
lockmans and Blockmans (1979), Munro (1972); Pusch (1932); Tyrolean Kreuzer: 
15 Debasement data sources: Florin: Bernocchi (1975); Rhinegulden and Albus of T
Weisenstein (1995); Pound of Basel, Pound Rappenmünze: Altherr (1910), Cahn 
(1895); Mark and Albus of Cologne: Metz (1990); Mark of Pruss
B
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table 2.  The first three columns show the city and the gold and silver 
coins  
. The two 
s 
r the 
 
                                                                                                                                              
on which the calculation of the gold-silver ratios is based. The fourth
column gives the year of the intervention and the metal debased
next columns present the size of the sample of the gold-silver ratio serie
used for the Chow test, the value of the F-statistic and its level of 
significance. When the test is not performed, we do not provide the 
sample size, and write ’opposite’ in the sixth column. The last column 
shows if the results provide evidence of monetary motives. Wheneve
level of significance is higher than 1 percent, the decision is based on 
whether the graph conforms to the expected pattern. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
used 
Nagl (1906), Koch (1994); Ducat: Lane and Mueller (1985); Pound of Nuremberg: 
Scholler (1916); Schock Groates (Bohemia): Castelin (1973). The exchange rates 
in calculating the gold-silver ratios will be documented in the forthcoming ‘Handbook of 
Late Medieval Exchange’. 
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Table 2: Results of Tests for the Presence of Monetary Motivations 
behind Debasements in Central Europe 
Gold coin Silver coin Debasement N F statistic   M 
Base  No l Florin Pound of Basel 1373 (S)  Opposite
 No 
Base 4.32** No 
 .21*** Yes 
 2*** Yes 
 *** Yes 
Colog * Yes 
Colog  No 
 osite No 
 30 139.04*** Yes 
  44 43.70*** Yes 
   1510 (S) 38 0.76 No 
   1520 (S) 39 1.44 No 
Danzig Hungarian Florin Mark of Prussia 1442 (S)  Opposite No 
Düren Rhinegulden Albus of Cologne 1481 (S) 20 67.51*** Yes 
   1510 (S) 36 23.77*** Yes 
   1520 (S) 38 13.22*** Yes 
Ghen Florin Pound Grote 1354 (S)  Opposite No 
   1368 (S)  Opposite No 
Hall i.T. Rhinegulden Tyrolean Kreuzer 1461 (S) 24 40.58*** Yes 
Hamburg Rhinegulden Mark of Lübeck 1461 (S) 20 6.10** Yes 
Koblenz Rhinegulden Albus of Cologne 1481 (S) 52 22.93*** Yes 
   1510 (S) 37 21.98*** Yes 
   1520 (S) 37 7.87*** Yes 
Marienburg Hungarian Florin Mark of Prussia 1408 (S) 12 2.37 No 
Nuremberg Rhinegulden Pound of 
Nuremberg 
1510 (S) 26 144.64*** Yes 
Prague Rhinegulden Schock groates 1539 (S) 16 43.28*** Yes 
Trier Rhinegulden Albus of Trier 1419 (G) 21 29.01*** Yes 
   1438 (S) 30 9.91*** Yes 
   1464 (G) 24 7.24** No 
   1482 (S) 20 1.85 No 
   1488 (G)  Opposite No 
   1504 (S) 20 0.41 No 
   1510 (S) 25 0.61 No 
Vienna Hungarian Florin Pound of Vienna 1436 (S) 28 0.29 No 
      1460(S) 31 0.01 No 
Key: N=sample size, *=significant at the 10 percent level, **=significant at the 5 percent level, 
*=significant at the 1 percent level, M=evidence of monetary motivations, G=gold and S=silver. 
  1377 (S) 13 0.27 
l Rhinegulden Pound 
Rappenmünze 
1425 (S)  
30 
  1433 (S) 36 46
  1463 (S) 46 47.0
  1481 (S) 69 7.36
ne Florin Mark of Cologne 1372 (S) 12 218.44**
ne Rhinegulden Albus of Cologne 1420 (S) 15 2.18
  1438 (S)  Opp
  1455 (S) 
 1481 (S) 
t 
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In the case of the debasements of the Albus of Cologne in 148
1510 and 1520 it is possible to examine t
1, 
he effect of the debasement 
from the iew of th hile ev ry 
otivati onsistent fo emen ot  ca
e last oduce nce of monet atio s in D
and Koblenz, but not in Cologne.  be ex ive at
monetar  conditions could vary within a currency area, with the 
licat t not all case ry m  we pre
 that while the 1510 
debasement can be classif d as at least in part , t s n
case for the 1520 debasem nt, for which the re ist d b -
tiona a ver, d ea  ha
een inf is. An eed igh ted
when the magnitude of the intervention was small, shifts are less 
pparen fore the power of the Chow test is c veat 
he fo eme ude w 5 rce
 Pou n 137 te in d 1 , th
Pound of Nuremberg in 1510, the Albus of Trier nd 0,
in  a
T ds ev onetary  13 case
, i.e. i of the  confi t bo on
monetar  and monetary iss  played an impor n th rea
Consistent with Weber’s (1996: 483) argument ba e
Pound of Basel in the 1370s were redistributive , an  with
results of Kugler’s (2008) econometric analysis, l go ilv
ios ad rm and as nt  
there i  evidence of monetary issues in three cases out of four in Basel 
and in the one case from Hamburg. The exception from Basel (1425) 
 point of v ree cities. W idence of moneta
m ons is c r the first debas t, this is n  the se for 
th two, which pr d evide
This can
ary motiv n üren 
pected, g n th  
y
imp ion tha s where moneta otivations re sent 
are captured by our analysis. The data shows
ie  monetary his i ot the 
e sults are d orte y non
sta rity. Other signific nt results, howe o not app r to ve 
b luenced by th other issue that n s to be h ligh  is that 
a t; there is low. Th a applies 
to t llowing debas nts whose magnit  was belo  pe nt: 
The nd of Basel i 3, the Pound Gro  1354 an 368 e 
 in 1504 a  151  and 
the Rh egulden in 1419 nd 1488. 
he analysis fin idence of m motives in s out of 
30 n 44 percent  cases, thereby rming tha th n -
y ues tant role i e a . 
that the de sem nts of 
in nature d  the 
 the Base ld-s er 
rat justed in the afte ath of the 1373  1377 deb eme s; the
latter may have also been linked to fiscal issues. However, in line with the 
results of the previous analysis (cf. section 3), in the following period 
s
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occurr  
 of 
ns. 
Grote, 
nd that 
, was 
es 
t of 
e of 
 
 
 
 the 
nt 
ed at time when fiscal issues may have been present, whereas we
know that there in 1481 and in Hamburg in 1461 the fiscal contribution
seigniorage was negligible despite the magnitude of the interventio
Conversely, there is no evidence of monetary needs in the Flemish 
(Ghent) and Prussian cases (Marienburg and Danzig). This is despite 
slow minting before the 1354 and 1368 debasements of the Pound 
suggesting that the pattern was due to cities other than Ghent, a
the 1442 debasement of the Mark of Prussia may have been linked to 
commercial interests. The 1409 debasement of the Mark, however
carried out in the run-up to a war. In just one case (Cologne 1438), a 
debasement was carried out during a military conflict. In contrast to the 
wider tendency of the coinage, there is no evidence of monetary motiv
in this instance. Consistent with previous results, monetary motives were 
present significantly more often – in 60 as compared to 27 percen
cases – when the mint was not run by a prince. Despite the small sample 
size, this difference is sufficient for the chi-square test to reject the 
hypothesis of no association between political institutions and presenc
monetary motives at the 10 percent level. 
 
8.  Bullion Famines, War and Regime Types 
We examine the effects of bullion famines, warfare and regime
types on debasement through a regression analysis of data from England
and France as well as from Italy, Flanders and Central Europe. 
Debasement is measured in three ways: First, as a dummy variable 
(DEBASE). Second, as the ten years rolling standard deviation of the 
index of its bullion content (INSTABILITY), which is set to 1 in the first 
year for which data on the bullion content of the currency is available;
higher the standard deviation, the greater the currency instability. This 
measure has the advantage of taking into account not only how freque
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but also how significant changes were. Still, using the standard deviation 
as a measure of stability does not allow to distinguish between variations 
induced by debasement and reinforcement. This issue, which is 
particularly serious for gold currencies, is addressed by the third 
measure: The slope of the trend of the index (TREND). Only negative 
values are considered. To make the comparison with the others 
measures more straightforward, its value is multiplied by -1, so that it 
becomes greater the more rapidly the fine bullion content decreased. 
Obviously, in most years there was no debasement. Hence, these 
dependent variables imply that a Probit method should be used with th
first measure and a Tobit method with the other two. As we expect that 
gold and silver currencies may follow different dynamics, the two metals 
are examined separately. 
Given that we are working with a sample of debasements and th
all variables are strictly exogenous, we control for unobservable currency-
specific factors with random-effects. Unaccounted for time effects a
captured by decade dummies.16 Time dummies are also used to 
investigate the effect of the bullion famines
e 
at 
re 
 (FAMINE).17 We use two 
easures of war. The first one is a dummy variable signalling that at least 
ne place in the currency area was involved in a military conflict (WAR). 
cal debasement may 
occur 
ne place 
ated 
y 
m
o
The second one takes into account the facts that fis
also in the run-up of follow-up of wars, and that longer conflicts 
produce more severe fiscal strains. It measures the variable as the ten 
years moving average of the number of wars involving at least o
in the currency area (WAR_10). The effect of regime types is investig
in two ways. First, we compare princely currencies with those minted b
                                                 
16 In the case of the Probit analysis of gold these were not included as given, that a 
small minority of values of the dependent variable are one, it was difficult to achieve 
convergence. 
17 Examining the effects of the famines separately did not produce new results. 
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tes. 
s and 
 
nt, 
hi-
model 
                                                
monetary unions (UNION) and city-states (CITYSTATE).18 Since only one
gold currency was minted by a union between princes, in the case of gold 
we only compare princely currencies with those minted by city-sta
Second, we investigate the interaction between political institution
war.19 Table 3 shows the results. The first six columns refer to gold and
the following six ones to silver. The effect of each of the three 
independent variables is examined first without the interaction coefficie
and then with it (therefore there are six columns for each metal). The c
square statistics and the associated P-values indicate how well the 
fits the data by testing the hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to 0. 
 
18 CITYSTATE covers Italian city states as well as free Imperial cities and territorial 
le 
tion, after the sample mean was subtracted) before carrying out the 
cities that were autonomous with regard to monetary policies.  
19 Following Aiken and West (1991), war was centred (i.e. it was divided by the samp
standard devia
interaction analysis. 
Table 3: The Causes of Debasement: Econometric Analysis 
            Silver     Gold       
 DEBASE DEBASE INSTABILITY INSTABILITY TREND TREND DEBASE DEB TREND ASE INSTABILITY INSTABILITY TREND 
FAMINE  -0.0422 0.0327 0.0329 0.0044 0.0043 -0.1847 -0.1
-
0.0059*** 
WAR 0.1079     0.2087**  
WAR_  0.0018 -0.0066 -0.0064 -0.0209  0.0001 
UNION      -0.121 -0.1 -0.0029 
CITYSTATE 0.0079 0.0240 0.0241 0.0028  -0.1970 -0.1 -0.0033* 
WAR*        
WAR*CITYST 0.0165      -0.0  
WAR_10*       0.0033*** 
WAR_10*CIT   0.0030  0.0044**  0.0004 
        
Decade dummie No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Y Yes 
Random effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Y Yes 
Probability > χ 0.9641 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0112 0.0 0.0000 
Model Wald χ 0.59 75.40 75.68 78.68 80.52 35.81 35. 167.10 
N 2050 1843 1843 1843 1843 3719 37 3441 
Key: *=significan rcent level, **=significant at the 5 percent level, ***=significant at the 1 percent level, N  
-
0
0
UNION  
UNION 
s 
 
t at the
0.0420
.1147 
10  
  
.0120 
ATE  
 
YSTATE 
 
No 
Yes 
2 0.8992 
2 0.59 
2050 
 10 pe
841 -0.0190*** -0.0177*** 
-
0.0059*** 
0.1994    
 0.0071*** 0.0087*** 0.0007* 
3 318 -0.1427* -0.136* -0.0026 
963 -0.0171** -0.0175** -0.0030* 
0.0717    
168    
  0.0013  
  -0.0063*  
    
es Yes Yes Yes 
es Yes Yes Yes 
222 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
93 195.74 200.71 159.71 
19 3441 3441 3441 
=sample size. 
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The  cy of deba plies that the Tobit models 
perform better than the Probit model d when Probit is used, we 
are not even able to reject the null hypothesis of no association between 
debasement and the inde n  The results highlight that 
bullion m s re a litical ons have limited or no 
explanatory power for alterations of the gold coinage. The coefficients of 
FAMINE, WAR and WAR_10 all have stent signs across 
specifi i  a  never significant. Although it appears that in city-
states, gold tended to be debased more often, and that war caused 
greate n io ns th erritories, the interaction 
coefficient is significant at the 5 per y in one case. Moreover, 
the magnitude of the coefficients tends to be considerably smaller than for 
silve e basement and warfare is 
consistent with Sussman’s (1993: 67 f.) and Volckart’s (2009) observation 
that the demand for  respect to its intrinsic 
 a cons e, the incentives to debase for fiscal purposes 
e w k fo o han for silver. The findings suggest that in both 
ti a c tates the gold was debased mainly for other 
son s h ountering Gres am’s w. 
e stor h s with sil s produces 
u  of statistically significant results. T ugh highly significant in 
r ca s out of six, the sign of FAMINE is negative, rather than positive. 
s in a ents, the bullion famines 
tric  the scope for interventions because there was less money that 
ld d rde n rought to the mints. Even if debasements 
tra u  we a ularly 00-10 and 1440-60 (cf. 
i i and Volckart, 2009), these were part of wider cyclical dynamics 
ch  red  the decad he famine dummies, 
g  the ttern r cted io  ’cleanings’ of the money 
rket. Across specific he expected sign, and in four 
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 out of six it is significant, showing that even if debasement was 
carried out during a conflict in fewer than 20 percent of the cases, war 
made it significantly more likely. The same holds for principalities. 
Monetary unions and especially city-states debased significantly less 
frequently and had more stable currencies than princes. In fact, mar
effect analysis based on the Probit model without interaction shows that 
the importance of political institutions was comparable to that of w
Other things being equal, any new observation has a probability of being 
a debasement of 6.33 percent. The likelihood of debasing the curren
increased by 2.91 percentage points in the presence of war, and by 2.34
percentage points when the currency provider was a prince rather than a 
city-state. Still, the evidence that war was more important for princes than 
for other polities is mild and inconsistent. This does not necessarily imply
that regime types were not important in motivating debasement. This 
perspective sits uneasily with the higher frequency of debasements in
princely territories, as well as with the previous analysis. Rather, the 
result suggests first that Louis de Male was not exceptional. Princes of
debased their currency as a regular source of revenue, i.e. even wh
there was no war. Second, it suggests that Florenc
o be typical, with other polities occasionally also debasing for fiscal 
reasons, particularly if war caused a sudden need. 
 
 
9. Conclusion 
In conclusion, was debased money good or bad? It was not ba
the sense that it embodied regressive taxation. In the late Middle Ages,
the influence of merchants and members of the nobility on monetary 
policies was associated with the supply of silver currencies that were
stable in comparison to those produced by princes. Correspondingly, 
against conventional wisdom, in Florence, Hamburg and Bruges there
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no evidence that real wages suffered systematically as a result of silve
debasements; on the contrary, nominal wages usually adjusted more th
proportionally to silver debasements before prices rose, so that rea
wages increased in the short run and may have increased as a 
consequence of the policy also in the long term. Two implications follow: 
First, with wage-earners typically being poorly informed about monetary 
alterations, the dynamic suggests political interventions that aimed at 
compensating them and preventing social unrest. In so far, the 
institutional background to late medieval debasements may efficiently 
have addressed issues of asymmetric information. Future research 
should further explore the nature of the underlying institutional setting. 
Second, if institutional constraints on the negotiation of other regular 
payments such as rents imply that clergy and aristocracy were the main 
losers, ‘hidden’ debasement was not a particularly regressive form of 
taxation. Indeed, the opposite holds. 
Both conventional and novel approaches show that monetary 
motives were important. Indeed, debasements of gold appear to have 
been almost exclusively monetary. Monetary motivations, however, do 
not make debasement an unmitigated blessing. Excess demand of bullio
and the bullion famines were a not a major cause of debasement in the 
late Middle Ages. On the contrary, the evidence is th
r 
an 
l 
n 
at they restricted the 
cope for it. Insofar as monetary debasements were reacting to 
ebasements carried out by other authorities, the game had a negative 
age of ‘bullion wars’ aptly describes the dynamics 
in this
 of 
ed 
s
d
sum. Munro’s (1972) im
 respect. Yet, the trope is also misleading. Firstly, even if 
debasements were not primarily aimed at addressing bullion shortages 
and wear and tear, they could be used to ‘cure’ other chronic ailments
the commodity money system such as those resulting from a rise of a 
coin’s intrinsic above its face value. Secondly, the circulation of debas
foreign coins was only one of several sources of uncertainty concerning 
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the intrinsic value of coins. Allowing an increase in the supply of coins of
uniform quality, debasements would then contribute to a fall in transaction 
costs. The assessment of late medieval debasements therefore rema
crucially dependent on how important monetary motivations wer
contribution of this paper is to show in which way advances in the 
quantification of the relevance of these motives can be made. 
Warfare was a major cause of silver debasement, and regime ty
were almost as important. Princes debased silver more often, an
probably did so for fiscal reasons more frequently than monetary union
and particularly city-states. This was true also if there were no excep
fiscal needs. This implies that either late medieval princes did not enjoy
comparatively better developed systems of taxation than city-states, o
that fiscal debasements did not reflect weak taxation structures. The 
alternative interpretation sees fiscal debasements as a consequence o
princely autonomy in monetary matters. Princes were 
 
ins 
e. One 
pes 
d 
s 
tional 
 
r 
f 
unable to commit 
credib or 
 
 
ikely 
, also for 
n 
 
ly to a stable currency (cf. Volckart, 2009) and to debase only f
monetary reasons when the subjects lacked institutional means 
effectively to influence monetary and fiscal policies. This explains why in
pre-1384 Flanders fiscal debasements were particularly frequent, 
notwithstanding a comparatively well-developed credit market, and why 
even though the Prussian government was probably the best organised in
Central Europe, it continued to rely on fiscal debasements. The l
prevalence of fiscal debasements in princely territories was not 
necessarily a ‘scourge’. They allowed princes to increase their revenues 
at short notice, and were, according to our results on real wages
the subjects preferable to loans and indirect taxation. Our perspective ca
therefore cast a new light on the decline of autonomous cities and the rise
of territorial states in the fifteenth century: This may owe less to the 
superior taxing ability of the state than to the ability to carry out fiscal 
debasements more easily than cities.
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